Válka začala v Mnichově – Dobrylovský Jiří (2018)

Based on the assessment of the real balance of power between Czechoslovakia and Germany in the autumn of 1938, historians and military specialists generally agree that after the betrayal of the Western allies in Munich, our situation was hopeless, and President Beneš's capitulation most likely saved the nation. The German superiority in decisive weapons (air force, armored troops, artillery) was evident and overwhelming. If we had resisted, we would likely have ended up like Poland less than a year later – or perhaps even worse, as Hungarian and Polish territorial demands against us were also in play. But what if Czechoslovakia had chosen a different path in the 1930s, not drowning billions in the concrete of border fortifications and instead dedicating them to the development of active, offensive strategies? What would have happened if in September 1938, the Czechoslovak Republic had not had just 470 tanks (compared to 1800 German ones) and 570 combat aircraft (against 3300 on the German side)? What if this ratio had been different, completely and fundamentally different? History does not indulge in conditionals. However, let us allow for an exception.